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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, the National Hockey League (“NHL”), National Football League 
(“NFL”) and National Basketball Association (“NBA”) became the first major 
North American sports leagues to announce social media restrictions.1 The major 
sports leagues have similar social media policies, the broadest of which extends 
longstanding copyright infringement warnings to social media websites like 
Facebook and Twitter.2 The more narrow social media restrictions limit only play-
by-play uploading by players, personnel and coaches, while the broader restrictions 
purport to prohibit real-time uploading of play-by-play game approximations by all 
Internet users.3  The NFL, which has always barred play-by-play descriptions of 
games in progress, extended that ban to social media platforms, requesting that 
social media play-by-play game accounts be time delayed and limited in amount, in 
order to protect the game coverage of accredited licensees.4 The leagues’ request 
that social media platforms not host game time play-by-play approximations raises 
questions regarding sports leagues’ enforcement of their intellectual property 
rights.  Given that billions of social media users around the globe are able to upload 
from virtually any public sporting event or broadcast using mobile devices, the 
sports leagues’ social media policies face issues of enforceability.  Contract and 
property law supply the legal framework for leagues’ authority to control the 
uploading capabilities of sports arena attendees.5
          * J.D. Candidate 2011, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2008, Harvard University.
Employment law forms the legal 
1. See Steve Keating, North American Pro Sports Leagues in a Twitter Over Tweeting,
REUTERS, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5905BZ20091001.
2. See id.
3. Staci D. Kramer, New NFL Policy Limits Social Media Use on Game Day,
PAIDCONTENT.ORG (Aug. 31, 2009, 5:50 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-new-nfl-policy-limits-
social-media-use-on-game-day/; see also Associated Press, League Announces Policy on Social Media 
Before and After Games, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2009), http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=0900
0d5d8124976d&template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.
4. Kramer, supra note 3; see also Associated Press, supra note 3.
5. The leagues could restrict arena spectators’ mobile uploading through a contract written on 
the back of their purchased tickets or by posting signs that warn of infringing uploads.  See 2 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:45 (Danny R. Veilleux et al. eds., 4th 
ed. 2007) (stating that a contract is enforceable to the ticket holder where “its terms and the 
circumstances surrounding its issue and acceptance, would reasonably communicate . . . that his or her 
rights are being affected by a contract” and where “sign or placard was actually read or was so 
conspicuous that it ought to have been read”).
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backbone of the leagues’ uploading restrictions covering players, coaches, officials 
and league personnel.6  Yet, by purporting to extend traditional copyright law to 
social media sites, and by stating that play-by-play approximations might infringe 
accredited rights holders, the new restrictions potentially reach millions of
independent users.  As the sports leagues may face challenges as to whether social 
media restrictions are legal and enforceable, the leagues might look to copyright 
law through theories of secondary liability and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).7 Alternatively, the leagues can look to state law, with claims 
tailored to navigate around the so-called “hot news” preemption doctrine.8
This Note proceeds in three parts.  Part I traces the explosion of social media 
outlets today and the threat that the Internet poses to the leagues’ licensed networks 
and copyrighted products.  Part II describes the relevant legal background and case 
precedent that guides sports organizations’ intellectual property rights in the 
Internet age.  Part III applies the relevant legal framework to the sports leagues’ 
social media policies, arguing that copyright law could protect sports leagues’ 
prohibition of play-by-play uploading of game progress, where the uploading is 
based on copyright protected broadcasts.  Given the difficulty of enforcing such 
copyright protection against individual users, this Note examines secondary 
liability and suggestions for enforcement through the notice and takedown 
provisions of the DMCA.  Finally, Part IV concludes with an alternative 
exploration of how the leagues might use the noncopyright “hot news” doctrine to 
protect their rights in the digital age.
I.  SPORTS LEAGUES’ POLICIES AS A RESPONSE TO THE THREAT 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A. SPORTS LEAGUES RELEASE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES
The NFL led the charge in announcing a social media policy in late August 
2009; now nearly all the major North American sports leagues, including the NHL 
and NBA, have established restrictions on social media site usage.9
6. See Douglas J. Wood, 5 Steps to Manage Social Media Risks, L. TECH. NEWS (Jan.15, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202438328710.
The Social 
Media Bible, the leading social media reference book for businesses, defines social 
media as “activities, practices, and behaviors among communities of people who 
7. The leagues may face “challenges” stemming from litigation to academic attacks.  In terms of 
litigation, consider the 2007 Computer & Communications Industry Association’s (“CCIA”) requested 
injunction against sports leagues’ alleged “manifestly false” copyright warnings, which the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) refused to grant and argued that risks of over-breadth should not bar 
copyright warnings.  See Scott L. Walker & Matthew Savare, Foul Use?:  FTC Declines to Take Action 
Against Allegedly Overbroad and Misleading Copyright Warnings, 25 ENT. & SPORTS L., no. 4, 2008 at 
1, 28; see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
[hereinafter DMCA] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
8. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 214 (1918).
9. See Keating, supra note 1.
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gather online to share information, knowledge, and opinions using conversational 
media,” which has been defined by another writer as “audio in a live chat room, 
text in a Twitter tweet, pictures . . . or video . . . .”10 This definition encompasses 
the leading social media sites Facebook and Twitter.  All the leagues have slightly 
different policies, but this analysis will focus on the foundational NFL policy, 
which is the most detailed.  According to the NFL restrictions, players, coaches and 
operational personnel can post to these social media platforms up to ninety minutes 
before kickoff and following post-game media interviews; referees are prohibited at 
all times from using social media.11 NFL policy also states that the guidelines are 
consistent with longstanding prohibitions against game play-by-play descriptions 
and that website hosts should therefore prohibit real-time, detailed play-by-play 
game approximations posted by any user to the extent that these approximations 
could substitute for the league’s licensed networks’ copyrighted broadcasts.12
The narrow social media directives for players, coaches, football operations and 
officiating personnel is akin to other private organizations’ employment policies, 
for example, a corporate policy of monitoring employees to make sure 
communications are consistent with company policy.
The 
social media policies include both narrow restrictions imposed on league players
and personnel and broad restrictions imposed on sites that host such game 
progression uploads.
13 The NFL actually 
recommends that clubs allow limited tweeting and blogging during public 
practices.14 Like any organization worried about confidentiality, the clubs are 
concerned with unchecked employee uploads posing a potential competitive 
disadvantage; “coaches worry reckless tweets may provide inspirational bulletin 
board material for opposing teams.”15
In addition to concerns with internal employee policing, the leagues’ social 
media policies address the threat that the massive explosion in social media 
10. LON SAFKO & DAVID K. BRAKE, THE SOCIAL MEDIA BIBLE 6 (2009); Wood, supra note 6.  
The authors of The Social Media Bible consulted with leading social media experts from companies and 
consulting firms, as well as New York Times bestselling authors nationwide, to assemble a content-rich 
social media bible.  See The Experts, SOC. MEDIA BIBLE, http://www.thesocialmediabible.com/the-
experts/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).
11. Associated Press, supra note 3.
12. Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 3.
13. This analysis will not delve into the employment and contract law considerations within such 
a social media policy.  Generally, courts have “granted employers broad discretion in disciplining 
employees where the employer can show that the off-duty [or on-duty] conduct has damaged the 
business, hurt the employer’s interests, or is otherwise inconsistent with the employer’s business needs.”  
William C. Martucci et al., Social Networking:  A Workplace Policy, LAW.COM (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=1202439369681.  In addition, the employee will have no 
privacy claims where social media update material can be accessed by a large number of individuals.  Id.
Lastly, for purposes of blogging and social networking, the applicability of the NLRA will hinge on 
whether the activity was concerted.  Id.
14. Associated Press, Teams Struggle with Policies on Twitter Usage as Site’s Popularity Grows,
NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE (2009), http://www.nfl.com/trainingcamp/story?id=09000d5d811aff8e&
template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true.
15. Keating, supra note 1.
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platforms poses to traditional broadcasting rights and licenses.  The NFL, NBA and 
NHL restrict players and coaches from Internet updating until after licensed media 
interviews are over.16
The leagues’ policy interest in protecting their licensed networks also justifies 
prohibiting certain game-related social media use as applied to all Internet users 
contributing play-by-play uploads.  The broadest of these restrictions prohibits 
social media sites from hosting play-by-play descriptions that approximate and 
potentially even substitute for licensed broadcasts.
The fact that such restrictions revolve around and are 
determined by the timing of licensed broadcast media illustrates how the leagues’ 
primary concern is with protecting their licensed networks as rights holders.
17 The NFL policy prohibits 
detailed play-by-play descriptions or real-time accounts of games that are uploaded 
or posted to social media platforms by any user.18 The league thus attempts to 
extend its traditional copyright infringement warning, which is announced at the 
beginning of every broadcasted game, to the Internet: “This telecast is copyrighted 
by the NFL for the private use of our audience.  Any other use of this telecast or 
any pictures, descriptions, or accounts of the game without the NFL’s consent is 
prohibited.”19
Longstanding policies prohibiting play-by-play descriptions of NFL games in 
progress apply fully to Twitter and other social media platforms. Internet sites may 
not post detailed information that approximates play-by-play during a game. While a 
game is in progress, any forms of accounts of the game must be sufficiently time-
delayed and limited in amount (e.g., score updates with detail given only in quarterly 
game updates) so that the accredited organization’s game coverage cannot be used as 
a substitute for, or otherwise approximate, authorized play-by-play accounts.
The NFL statement cited on social media use reads:
20
The policy explicitly applies traditional prohibitions against unaccredited 
substitutes for copyrighted licensed broadcasts to social media websites.  If Internet 
sites like Facebook and Twitter host game accounts, they must be time-delayed and 
limited to factual updates so as not to usurp accredited organizations’ broadcast 
rights.
Additionally, the NFL policy is a floor, allowing individual clubs the discretion 
to impose stricter social-media restrictions.21
16. Id.
At the beginning of the 2009 season, 
numerous club teams also imposed restrictions on workout and practice 
17. Kramer, supra note 3 (claiming that the application of copyright disclaimers to social media is 
“so that the accredited organization’s game coverage cannot be used as a substitute for, or otherwise 
approximate, authorized play-by-play accounts”); see also Associated Press, supra note 3 (“[T]he 
league, which has always barred play-by-play descriptions of games in progress, also extended that ban 
to social media platforms.”).
18. Kramer, supra note 3 (“The policy also lays out social media use rules for media applying 
‘longstanding policies prohibiting play-by-play descriptions of NFL games in progress’ to Twitter and 
the like . . . .”) .
19. See any telecast of an NFL game for a copyright disclaimer that airs either before the start of 
the second half or after the first commercial break of the second half.
20. Kramer, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
21. Associated Press, supra note 14.
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attendees.22 As discussed above, these more restrictive club level policies actually 
run contrary to the NFL’s recommendation that limited Internet use should be 
allowed during publicly accessible practices.  In justifying the restriction, many of 
the clubs and coaches look to their historical right to ban the use of cell phones, 
computers, PDAs and other electronic equipment on the sidelines.23 Although 
instances of enforcement and penalties have been scarce, the clubs have been 
successful in enforcing their policy through player fines, benching and monitoring 
their sidelines.24
Most other North American sports leagues have followed closely behind the 
NFL in establishing their own social media policies.25 In September 2009, the 
NBA announced its social media guidelines, which prohibit social media website 
use during games for players, coaches and other team personnel involved in the 
game, until after the post-game locker room media time.26 Those not participating 
in the particular game, such as spectators, front office employees or owners 
watching from the stands, are not prohibited from posting to social media platforms 
during games.27 Like the NFL, the NBA seems focused on protecting its licensed 
broadcast right holders by limiting social media use only until after obligations to 
traditional media outlets are fulfilled.28 Again focusing on licensed networks’ 
rights, most recently, in October 2009, the NHL announced that it was finalizing 
social media recommendations prohibiting players, coaches, trainers and all game-
related personnel from engaging in such activity close to “media access periods.”29
The NHL director of social media marketing commented,  “I looked at what the 
NBA was doing and what the NFL was doing and used those as a basis for my own 
recommendations.”30
22. The Miami Dolphins have the strictest policy, which prohibits fans and media at training 
camp practices from tweeting, blogging or texting.  The New England Patriots, Buffalo Bills, 
Indianapolis Colts, New Orleans Saints and the Detroit Lions also imposed further social media usage 
restrictions.  Associated Press, supra note 14.
  For all three leagues, the underlying concern was to
safeguard the rights of their accredited broadcast licensees.
23. Id. (discussing how, as an employer, the leagues can control such uploading activities, and
how, with contracts on the backs of tickets, the leagues can control what devices spectators bring into 
the arena.)
24. Current enforcement by the clubs and possibilities of enforcement will be addressed with
more specificity infra, see note 58.
25. Keating, supra note 1.  At the time of this writing, Major League Baseball (“MLB”) has no 
specific guidelines but pointed to a longstanding policy regarding communicational devices that 
prohibits their use thirty minutes before the start of a game.  Id.




29. Keating, supra note 1.
30. Id.
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B. CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE 
SPORTS INDUSTRY
Although social media sites are only a few years old, nineteen percent of 
Internet users today use such sites to share updates about themselves or view 
updates about others.31 Leading national studies indicate that “it is clear that a 
‘social segment’ of Internet users is flocking to both social network sites and status 
update services” and that this segment of Internet users promises to grow 
exponentially in the coming years.32 Comparable to the reach of television and 
radio, one Twitter user can have more than 86,000 followers.33 In September 2010, 
Twitter reported 175 million registered users and 95 million tweets per day.34 The 
most successful social media network, Facebook, boasts more than 500 million 
active users with a majority logging on to the social media platform each day.35
Most relevant for this analysis, more than 30 billion pieces of content (web links, 
news stories, blog posts, notes, videos) are shared each week by users; more than 
200 million users access Facebook through their mobile devices.36 Facebook 
recently topped Google as the most visited U.S. website, indicating a shift in how 
Americans search for content on the web.37 To provide some perspective, 147 
million viewers tuned in during the 2009 Super Bowl, the third most watched 
television program in history, while Facebook has at least 250 million viewers on 
any given day.38
Sometimes clips from copyrighted broadcasts are uploaded to such websites.39
31. Susannah Fox, Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Twitter and Status Updating Fall 2009, PEW
INTERNET (Oct. 21, 2009), http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2009/17-Twitter-and-Status-Updating-Fall-
2009.aspx.  This October report marked an eight percent increase from just April 2009.  Id. The Pew 
Internet and American Life Project is the most recent project of the Pew Research Center exploring the 
impact of the Internet on contemporary society and aims to be an authoritative source on the evolution 
of the Internet through surveys that examine how Americans use the Internet.  See About Us, PEW
INTERNET, http://pewinternet.org/About-Us/Project-History.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
32. Id.; see also Amanda Lenhart, Adults and Social Network Websites, PEW INTERNET (Jan. 14, 
2009), http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2009/Adults-and-Social-Network-Websites.aspx (noting that with 
a quadrupled share since four years ago, now almost forty percent of contemporary adult Internet users 
have a profile on an online social network site).
33. Adam Singer, 49 Amazing Social Media, Web 2.0 and Internet Stats, FUTURE BUZZ (Jan. 12, 
2009), http://thefuturebuzz.com/2009/01/12/social-media-web-20-Internet-numbers-stats/.
34. About Us, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
35. Facebook Press Room, Statistics, FACEBOOK (last visited Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics.
36. Id. The growth of Facebook mobile is an important endeavor for the social media platform as 
there are more than 200 mobile operators in sixty countries working to deploy and promote Facebook 
mobile products.  Id.
37. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Traffic Tops Google for the Week, CNN MONEY (Mar. 16, 
2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/16/technology/facebook_most_visited/index.htm?hpt=T2.
38. David B. Wilkerson, Super Bowl XLIII Draws Average 95.4 Million Viewers,
MARKETWATCH (Feb. 3, 2009, 10:35 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/super-bowl-xliii-draws-
average-954.
39. Jason J. Lunardi, Note, Guerilla Video:  Potential Copyright Liability for Websites that Index 
Links to Unauthorized Streaming Content, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1077, 1083 
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Given the potential reach of these sites to billions of users, combined with the real-
time capabilities of uploading photos, descriptions and videos, it is easy to 
appreciate the leagues’ concerns with infringement of their intellectual property 
rights and licenses under the 1976 Copyright Act.40 With millions participating 
every minute of the day, all over the world, online peer sharing has been described 
by one legal analyst as “an epidemic” that “raise[s] a myriad of risks,” including 
risks to intellectual property.41 Confronted with the reality of social media’s 
massive hosting capabilities, all three leagues share a justified, underlying concern 
for their traditional network licensees.  The leagues focus their policies on 
prohibiting social media in temporal proximity to licensed interviews, and the NFL 
in particular has extended its warnings only where such sites host uploads that 
could substitute for the licensed networks’ broadcasts.42  The sports leagues thus 
join the larger entertainment industry in attempting to protect traditional intellectual 
property rights in the Internet age, where “at least 50 million citizens have been 
seduced into copyright infringement—a civil wrong—by its ease and convenience 
using current technology.”43
The emergence of online peer sharing, coupled with growing global interest in 
professional sports, means that potential broadcast revenue generated by television 
contracts is likely to be undercut and devalued.44 Research on online sports piracy 
suggests a “global paradigm of online piracy of live sports telecasts is emerging 
with worrisome growth characteristics.”45 Real-time transmissions of live telecast 
signals have been used to pirate programming from networks including ESPN, 
FOX, NBA TV, NBC, NFL Network and a number of regional sports networks.46
“Evidence indicates that in 2007, [peer-to-peer services] were used to pirate 
thousands of hours of live sports telecasts.”47 The potential harm to sports leagues’ 
revenues is just now beginning to be understood.48
Much academic discussion has centered upon the argument that these sports 
(2009) (discussing the piracy of entire television shows and movies online).
40. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006).
41. Wood, supra note 6.
42. Kramer, supra note 3 (“[O]ne of the league’s official tweeters (@NFLprguy), told 
paidContent the rules are meant to keep the focus on the game and preserve the rights of credentialed 
media.”).
43. Michael J. Mellis, Internet Piracy of Live Sports Telecasts, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259, 
264 (2007) (quoting JAY DRATLER, CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE DIGITAL 
MILLENNIUM § 601[2] (2006)); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. 
Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding distributor of peer-to-peer file sharing computer networking 
software  liable for inducement of copyright infringement via the Internet and other digital pathways).
44. Chia-heng Seetoo, Note, Can Peer-to-Peer Internet Broadcast Technology Give Fans 
Another Chance?  Peer-to-Peer Streaming Technology and Its Impact, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 369, 
370 (2007).
45. Mellis, supra note 43, at 259.
46. Id. at 261.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 260; see also Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the Exclusive Right to Control 
Dissemination of Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 167, 168 (2004).
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leagues do not need the extra protection of the copyright law regime in order to 
have the incentive to continue to produce athletic performances.49 These
arguments ignore the reality that “over two-thirds of the total revenues of the NFL 
and over half of the revenues of the [NBA] and [MLB]” come from television, and 
these revenues hinge on the sports entities’ exclusive control over the broadcasters’ 
rights to televise games.50 Unlike other forms of entertainment with weaker viewer 
demand for live broadcasts, sports fans care not only about the final results but also 
about the progression of a game.  Professional sports are “uniquely vulnerable” to 
streaming, peer-to-peer file sharing or play-by-play update technology because 
sports fans are “far less interested in watching yesterday’s games of which the 
results are already known.”51 Sports leagues’ performance products have time-
sensitive value on the day that they are broadcast to the public.  Because the core of 
sports entertainment is the real-time progression of the game, “if a network is 
paying millions or hundreds of millions of dollars for rights, the network sales 
force needs to sell advertisers on the fact that the only place that the product is 
available is on their network.”52
If the game progression, real-time accounts and descriptions are available on the 
Internet, this availability will reduce the number of viewers, or at the very least, 
will “change the viewing experience with respect to how advertisers determine 
value.”53 As noted above, two-thirds of sports leagues’ revenue hinges on such 
exclusivity guarantees in order to pay median player salaries of up to $1.325 
million.54 The social media user who circumvents the television market and makes 
a game’s play-by-play progress directly available to the public on the Internet could 
“significantly affect[] the NFL broadcast’s immediate value.”55
49. Michael E. Plantinga, Note, An Amended Doctrine that Will Silence the NFL:  The Demise of 
the Existing Fair Use Doctrine as it Relates to Uses of Digital Sports Entertainment Media, 14 J. TECH.
L. & POL’Y 51, 74 (2009) (“The NFL cannot claim any type of meaningful future harm because despite 
people’s posting NFL clips on the Internet for a number of years, this activity has not even slightly 
disturbed the NFL’s unwavering multi-billion dollar annual revenue.”); see also Timothy W. Havlir, Is 
Fantasy Baseball Free Speech?  Refining the Balance Between the Right of Publicity and the First 
Amendment, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 241 (2008) (given the “high salaries of 
professional athletes, the competitive nature of sports, and an independent desire for fame, immensely 
large revenues from other sources, it seems doubtful that publicity rights encourage athletes to compete 
at a higher level”); Matthew J. Mitten, A Triple Play for the Public Domain:  Delaware Lottery to 
Motorola to C.B.C., 11 CHAP. L. REV. 569, 574 (2008) (arguing that the creation of collateral Internet 
products does not “discourag[e] the production of ‘officially licensed or authorized’ products by sports 
leagues”).
Since regular 
season football telecasts and game performances are major productions where the 
50. Roberts, supra note 48, at 167 (emphasis added).
51. Seetoo, supra note 44, at 376.
52. Robert Hacker & Vered Yakovee, Legal Aspects of Big Sports Events Management Part IV:  
Broadcasting, 25 ENT. & SPORTS L., no. 3, 2007 at 1, 35.
53. Id.
54. USA Today Salaries Database, USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/
salaries/mediansalaries.aspx?year=2009 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011) (listing median salaries of NFL 
players in 2009 by team).
55. Plantinga, supra note 49, at 74.
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cost of putting on a single game performance can be between $150,000 and 
$250,000, any decrease in broadcast revenue affects incentives to produce the sport 
performance.56  Given that the onslaught of social media is so recent, the 
quantitative impact of such hosts remains to be seen.  However, the statistics 
concerning online piracy of live sports telecasts through peer-to-peer streaming and 
unicast technologies are worrisome.57
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AS SOLUTION
Additionally, continuous social media 
updates, real-time play-by-play accounts, uploaded videos and photos pose a 
similar threat.  Finally, as addressed below, the leagues have also developed 
competing social media products.  The NFL, NBA and NHL all have their own 
Facebook and Twitter accounts and products.  Unaccredited social media Internet 
uploaders would be in direct competition with social media products offered by the 
leagues.
Although the league policies outlined are justifiable responses to the threats 
posed by unauthorized Internet infringement of league products, enforcement on 
the Internet is problematic.  This Section suggests ways in which the leagues may 
nevertheless look to intellectual property law as a remedy.
One criticism of the NFL’s social media policy is the feasibility of enforcement.  
Different legal and remedial contexts apply to the extension of guidelines to all 
game descriptions on social media outlets as compared to the extension of 
guidelines to league personnel.  NFL clubs have already taken successful corrective 
measures in policing their teams.58  In August 2010, the NFL fined Chad 
Ochocinco $25,000 for breaking the NFL’s game-day Twitter policy by posting 
tweets just an hour before kickoff and again an hour into the game (after taking a 
particularly tough hit).59
56. David Biderman, Football Games Have 11 Minutes of Action, FOX SPORTS ON MSN (Jan. 22, 
2010), http://msn.foxsports.com/nfl/story/football-games-have-11-minutes-of-action-011810.
Yet, the social media policies as applied to outside 
spectators and fans seem to be unrealistic, leading one commentator to 
57. Unicast refers to “one-to-one distribution of a media stream from a central server to an end 
user’s computer” and streaming over peer-to-peer “involves a media stream being passed through the 
Internet among network participants.”  Mellis, supra note 43, at 260.  “In both cases, the technologies 
enable real-time transmissions of live telecast signals on a worldwide basis.”  Id.; see also Definition of 
Peer-to-Peer Networks, PC MAG. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/
0,2542,t=peer-to-peer+network&i=49056,00.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
58. Associated Press, Jets Coach Ryan Benched WR Clowney After Tweets, NAT’L FOOTBAL 
LEAGUE (2009), http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d813002f9&template=with-video-with-
comments&confirm=true (providing that the New York Jets coach Rex Ryan benched wide receiver 
David Clowney who tweeted complaints about playing time); Associated Press, supra note 14 (showing 
that the Chargers recently fined cornerback Antonio Cromartie $2,500 for using Twitter to give 
information about training camp.); Stein, supra note 26 (stating that as of this writing, the NBA’s only 
Twitter-related fine has punished Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban when he was docked $25,000 
for complaining about referees’ refusal to call a foul).
59. Ebenezer Samuel, Chad Ochocinco Apologizes to NFL Commissioner for In-Game Tweet, 
Suggests Different Punishment, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/
sports/football/2010/08/25/2010-08-25_ochocinco_tweets_another_apology_for_tweeting.html.
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pessimistically “wish the league office the best of luck in keeping Joe Schmoe in 
Kokomo from trying to become the Twitter and/or USTREAM version of Al 
Michaels.”60 However, the daunting task of enforcement hasn’t stopped the Miami 
Dolphins from attempting to police thousands of spectators at its practices.  A 
spokesperson for the team commented: “I would acknowledge that enforcing the 
restrictions can be difficult.  We’re not looking over everybody’s shoulder, but we 
do have a concern about information flow.”61
Given such difficulties, the sports industry may consider turning to copyright 
litigation and adopting a legal strategy similar to that used by the Motion Picture 
Association of America (“MPAA”).  As the MPAA’s now former general counsel 
proclaimed: “[Y]ou can’t sue everybody.  Often lawsuits are intended to establish a 
principle, and in a lot of cases people are law-abiding.  They will follow the 
decisions of the courts.”
Although the Dolphins claim 
success in policing their practice spectators, it seems impossible for the league to 
police all Facebook and Twitter uploads for play-by-play descriptions, photo or 
video uploads.
62
If social media uploads can be shown to infringe the leagues’ copyright 
broadcast rights, as discussed in Part III, infra, social media sites could be 
secondarily liable, which would implicate the unique availability of the DMCA, 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c).
As with the movie industry, sports leagues would 
benefit from a judicially established principle that more clearly supports their 
claims regarding illegally uploaded play-by-play descriptions.
63 The DMCA gives Internet service providers and “hosting” 
services a safe harbor from secondary liability for copyright infringement where 
such sites, like Facebook and Twitter, are hosting content at the direction of third-
party users.64 The safe harbor provision of the DMCA is available to website hosts 
if the website can demonstrate that it 1) had neither actual nor constructive 
knowledge that the system contained infringing material or 2) received no financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringement where it has the right and ability to 
control and 3) responded expeditiously to remove or disable access to the 
infringing material.65 In order to be shielded from secondary liability, website 
hosts thus must adopt and implement (and inform account holders of the service 
provider’s system or network of) a policy that terminates account holders of the 
service provider’s system who are repeat infringers; and the website must 
accommodate and not interfere with standard technical measures.66
60. Gregg Rosenthal, NFL Adopts Game Day Social Media Policy, NBC SPORTS (Aug. 31, 2009, 
4:08 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/08/31/nfl-adopts-game-day-social-media-policy/.
  The DMCA 
61. Associated Press, supra note 14.
62. David Hechler, Piracy on Fast Forward, LAW.COM (Sept. 7, 2007),
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1189069353022 (referring to MPAA success in the 
seminal Grokster litigation).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
64. Karl Oakes, Copyrights and Intellectual Property § 103, in 18 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM
(2010).
65. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
66. Oakes, supra note 64, § 103 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)).
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limits social media hosting sites’ liability where such sites take infringing material 
down, authorizes the issuance of subpoenas to identify infringers and authorizes 
injunctive relief.67 Thus, sports leagues could operate through the DMCA in order 
to invoke such “notice and takedown” provisions and force website hosts like 
Facebook and Twitter to remove those few unauthorized accounts that continually 
approximate play-by-play game progression and infringe on copyrighted 
broadcasts.  In fact, the leagues have already invoked the DMCA by sending 
takedown notices to YouTube for video posts that they believe infringe their 
broadcasts.68
The preceding backdrop has outlined the details of the leagues’ social media 
policies as a response to social media sites’ potential threat to sports leagues’ 
licensed networks and their copyrighted broadcast material.  The next Section 
examines how both copyright and state law have been employed by the sports 
industry in protecting its broadcast rights.
Part III of this Note will analyze whether the leagues have sufficient 
copyright infringement claims to invoke this DMCA takedown enforcement power 
against those sites that host real-time play-by-play descriptions of sports games.
II.  PAST COPYRIGHT AND STATE LAW PROTECTION OF SPORTS 
LEAGUE PRODUCTS
In pursuing federal copyright remedies, sports leagues must confront serious 
barriers to the claim that social media uploads are infringing.  This Part will 
demonstrate that: 1) there is a current understanding, though questionable, that
there can be no infringement where the defendant’s Internet product originates in 
the unprotected game facts or the sports performance itself; 2) in order to be 
infringing, the defendant’s product must be expressive and descriptive enough to 
“copy” a league’s copyrighted material and must actually take from the expressive 
elements of the copyrighted sports broadcast; and lastly, 3) web sites must arguably 
be secondarily liable for users’ infringement in order to require that these sites 
invoke the DMCA notice and takedown provisions.
If, on the other hand, the leagues choose to pursue state law claims to protect 
accredited broadcast holders, the claims could be based on some form of state 
property law or, more narrowly, qualify under the “hot news” doctrine in order for 
such state law claims to survive federal copyright preemption.69
Although sports leagues are able to control the radio and television exploitation 
of their product, the leagues have only just started to explore how to contend 
against the Internet exploitation of their performances; thus, any of the foregoing 
copyright law and state law remedies tailored to this problem will be necessarily 
novel.
67. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(g), (h), (j)).
68. Plantinga, supra note 49, at 53.
69. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 214 (1918) (discussing “hot news” 
doctrine).
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A. NO COPYRIGHT IN THE UNDERLYING ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE OR 
STATISTICS
The first hurdle facing the sports industry is the “general understanding” that 
there is no copyright ownership in the underlying athletic performance.  In the only 
case where a league has asserted a copyright in an athletic performance, the Second 
Circuit flippantly dismissed all copyright claims on summary judgment and the 
ruling was not appealed.70 This rule relies on the omission from the Copyright Act 
of 1976 of any category of protected work that encompasses sports performances.71
Academics contend that any claim of copyright infringement in the underlying 
games must fail because athletic events are not copyrightable.72 As will be 
discussed, this Note leaves open the possibility that with the benefit of deeper case 
law analysis, professional sports performances could be copyrightable in the 
future.73
Statistics, raw data lists and fantasy league information about an athletic 
performance qualify as “facts” of the performance, where facts are not 
copyrightable.74 In lawsuits over the use of statistics on the Internet, both players 
and the leagues have been precluded from claiming that Internet producers violated 
any copyright.75 For example, in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, a federal 
district court in Missouri held that a certain collection of statistics did not constitute 
a copyrightable compilation because the MLB branch responsible for the statistics 
did not engage in any unique assemblage of baseball data; the statistics lacked the 
requisite creativity.76
70. Roberts, supra note 48, at 168–69 (citing Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 939 F. 
Supp. 1071, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Motorola I), rev’d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997));
see also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (Motorola II).  However, 
this lonely Second Circuit case cited no cases to substantiate its dismissal of copyrights in the live game 
performances and relied only on a “general understanding,” which leaves open the possibility that 
professional sports performances could be copyrightable in the future.  Id. at 846–47 (emphasis added).
The court held that public domain lists of major league 
baseball players and their statistics lacked the originality requirement for copyright 
71. See 17 U.S.C. §102 (2006) (enumerating the categories of works protected by copyright).
72. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09[F] (2010).  
Similarly, in another case regarding whether a sports-like exercise was copyrightable, a defendant 
invested in a series of twenty-six yoga exercises called asanas.  The court ruled that indeed, yoga 
exercises did not meet the requisite creativity.  WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS 
LAW § 20:2 (2d ed. Supp. 2010) (citing Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhurry, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434 
(N.D. Cal. 2005)).
73. As will be discussed, infra note 90, in Baltimore Orioles, Inc., v. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 669 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986), the MLB argued for copyright in the game 
performance spectacle by correctly asserting “only a modicum of creativity is required for a work to be 
copyrightable.”  Further case law may agree with this contention.
74. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349–51 (1991) (finding that 
while expression of an idea or fact is copyrightable, the idea or the raw facts themselves are not 
copyrightable).
75. CBS Interactive, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 259 F.R.D. 398 (D. Minn. 
2009); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 
(E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
76. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., 443 F.Supp.2d at 1101–03.
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protection.77 More recently, in CBS Interactive, Inc. v. National Football League 
Players Ass’n, a federal district court in Minnesota held that the operator of a 
fantasy football website did not violate any rights of the league by using 
professional football players’ names and statistics.78 The court there ruled that an 
online fantasy sports company did not need to get a license from the NFL Players 
Association to use old sports performance statistics, player reviews, injury updates 
and other information regarding the players and their respective NFL teams.79
B. STRONG COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP IN BROADCASTS
Although the leagues currently have no copyright ownership in underlying 
athletic performances and factual statistics, sports broadcasts are covered works of 
authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976, which demands that work be creative 
(i.e., an original work of authorship) and fixed (for more than transitory duration).80
Specifically, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102, “copyright protection subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”81  According to 17 U.S.C. § 101, the work is “fixed” if 
there has been an authorized embodiment in a copy or phonorecord and if that 
embodiment “is sufficiently permanent or stable” to permit the work “to be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than 
transitory duration.”82  Since broadcasts are considered sufficiently creative 
original works of authorship fixed for more than a transitory duration, the 
Copyright Act gives sports leagues the exclusive control and rights over their 
broadcasts, including the right to perform publicly, adapt and reproduce them.83
Congress stated in the House Report leading up to the enactment of the 1976 
Copyright Act:
When a football game is being covered by four television cameras, with a director 
guiding the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of their electronic 
images are sent out to the public and in what order, there is little doubt that what the 
cameramen and the director are doing constitutes ‘authorship.’84
Furthermore, the broadcast lasts for more than a trivial duration and is fixed if it 
is being simultaneously recorded.  Moreover, Congress added explicit language to 
the Copyright Act to protect sports broadcasts, expressing the intention that the 
definition of “fixation” in § 101 include “live broadcasts—sports, news coverage, 
77. Id.
78. CBS Interactive, 259 F.R.D. at 417–19.
79. Id.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
81. Id. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
82. Id. § 101 (emphasis added).
83. Id. § 106(1), (2), (4) (providing copyright owner with exclusive right to reproduce the work, 
make derivative works and to public perform the work).
84. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976).
HULL - formatted 4/19/2011 1:59 PM
470 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3
live performances of music, etc.”85 Accordingly, sports leagues have continually 
been granted injunctions to stop the infringement of sports programming.  In 
National Football League v. Rondor, Inc., the league and its teams enjoined owners 
of bars and restaurants from showing locally “blacked-out” games by receiving the 
game signal from a distant antenna.86 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in National 
Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., also maintained that a simultaneously 
recorded live broadcast of a football game is protected under the Copyright Act.87
The Seventh Circuit in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n repeatedly explained that sports performances can qualify as copyrightable 
subject matter because the types of shots, instant replays and frame selection supply 
the creativity required for copyright.88 Although the Second Circuit later 
disagreed, the Baltimore Orioles court asserted that player performances 
themselves could be copyrightable.89  It stated: “[Major League Baseball Players 
Association] argue[s] that their performances are not copyrightable works because 
they lack sufficient artistic merit. We disagree.  Only a modicum of creativity is 
required for a work to be copyrightable.”90 Although beyond the scope of this 
Note, Judge Winter’s reasoning in the authoritative Second Circuit case denying 
copyright protection seems to apply more to a backyard pick-up game rather than a 
professional sports performance and, in the future, strong copyright protection 
extended to broadcasts could be extended to entire professional sports 
performances.91
C. INTERNET INFRINGEMENT OF SPORTS INDUSTRY COPYRIGHTS 
Although no cases have been filed concerning Internet uploads of game details, 
recent district court cases have addressed the sports industry’s copyright 
protections when infringed on the Internet.  In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. 
iCraveTV, a district court ordering a preliminary injunction ruled that unauthorized 
85. Id.
86. Nat’l Football League v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
87. Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
88. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 
1986); see also Phila. Eagles Football Club, Inc. v. City of Phila., 823 A.2d 108, 122, (Pa. 2003) 
(reestablishing that a live telecast simultaneously recorded with transmission is copyrightable).
89. Balt. Orioles, Inc., 805 F.2d at 669.
90. Id. at 669 n.7.  Citing both case law and secondary sources, the court asserted:
Contrary to the Players' contentions, aesthetic merit is not necessary for copyrightability . . . . 
Players' performances possess the modest creativity required for copyrightability.  As Justice 
Holmes once declared, “if . . . [certain works] command the interest of any public, they have a 
commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value. 
. . .  That the Players' performances possess great commercial value indicates that the works 
embody the modicum of creativity required for copyrightability.
Id.
91. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (where Judge Winter argues that sports are too 
unintentional, such reasoning does not seem to apply to sports spectacles where painstaking preparation 
makes the entire performance—the cheerleaders, sideline, accompanying radio, game announcers, big 
screen videos and performance as a whole—seem more analogous to other sports performances).
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sports programming streaming, which gave Internet users the ability to watch the 
NBA and NFL’s real-time broadcasts online, violated the sports leagues’ 
copyrights.92 The court ruled that the sports leagues’ rights under 17 U.S.C. § 
106(4) to perform their works publicly—and to license or authorize others to do 
so—were infringed by unauthorized streaming of the live sports telecasts.93  The 
court found irreparable harm because the accredited rights holders “lost the control 
with which Congress vested them of the copyrighted materials [and] have lost the 
ability to offer particular outlets exclusively.”94  This decision was reinforced by 
National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, where the Second Circuit 
affirmed the injunction of a satellite carrier that made unauthorized transmissions 
of football broadcasts to subscribers in Canada.95 The court confronted new 
infringing technologies at different stages in the digital process and noted 
Congressional language that “[e]ach and every method by which [ ] images or 
sounds comprising a performance or display are picked up and conveyed is a 
‘transmission,’ and if the transmission reaches the public in [any] form, the case 
comes within the scope of [§ 106(4) or (5)].”96
Finally, in Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, a district court granted 
summary judgment to a sports company that “webcasted” (i.e., broadcasted via the 
Internet) live motor sports against a website that linked to the webcasts.97 The 
court ruled that the sports company had copyright ownership in the live broadcasts 
(either via television, radio or Internet webcasts), all of which constituted original 
audiovisual material copyrightable under the Copyright Act.98 The court 
analogized copyright protection for Internet webcasts to live television broadcasts, 
and instead of engaging in a technological analysis of how the link constituted a 
“copy,” the court seemed most attentive to equitable arguments including the sports 
company’s diminished economic ability to market itself as the exclusive source of 
motocross Internet broadcasts.99
92. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ. A. 00-120 & No. Civ. A. 00-121,
2000 WL 255989, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
The court was concerned with how the infringing 
website’s link to real-time streaming allowed users to bypass the LiveNation 
93. Id. at *7.
94. Id. at *8.
95. Nat’l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 12 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976)) (alterations in original).
97. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 79311, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Jan. 9, 2007).
98. Id. at *3.
99. Id. at *2–4; see also Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2006 WL 
3616983, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2006) (granting preliminary injunction).  Contrast this less 
technological approach with the Ninth Circuit, which took a much more technical approach in ruling that 
search engine inline links to images were not “copies” that infringed copyrighted photographs.  See 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 717 (9th Cir. 2007).  It must be noted that in Perfect 
10, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Google could only be held secondarily liable for search engine 
hyperlinks to infringing full-size Perfect 10 images if it had knowledge that the specific infringing 
images were available through its system and could have taken simple measures to prevent the damage 
to the plaintiff.  Id. at 729.
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homepage, resulting in economic substitution of the plaintiff’s product.100  Thus, 
the court focused on equitable arguments to protect the leagues investment-backed 
expectations in the control of their product.101
Although Circuit-level courts have yet to encounter sports companies’ copyright 
claims in this Internet context, at the district level there seems to be agreement that
unauthorized website streaming—or links to streaming, sports broadcasts or 
webcasts—constitutes copyright infringement.  On a policy level, the courts’ 
willingness to protect sports leagues against new technologies at every stage of the 
digital process, to extend copyright ownership to “webcasts” and to enjoin even a
link to streaming broadcasts, all signal judicial support for the application of 
traditional copyright remedies to other Internet activities, including the uploading 
of play-by-play game approximations.  The recognition of sports leagues’ lost 
control, lost ability to offer particular outlets, loss of customer good will and loss of 
reputational control suggests that the judicial system heeds equitable justifications 
and is aware of how the Internet uniquely threatens the leagues with economic 
market substitution.102
However, while the above cases are useful for analogizing to potentially 
infringing descriptive uploads, the streaming and linking at issue in those cases 
directly involved the entire sports broadcast and not merely descriptions or 
approximations of the broadcast.  Thus although an analysis of the case law 
demonstrates that sports leagues enjoy strong copyright protection for their 
broadcasts (even in this Internet age), case law addressing purported Internet 
infringement of less than an entire streamed or hyperlinked broadcast is a different 
matter.  Nevertheless, the leagues might look to the following line of cases to 
address more specifically whether game updates, rather than an entire broadcast 
stream, infringe on leagues’ copyrighted material.
D. THE MOTOROLACASE, STATE LAW CLAIMS AND GAME PROGRESSION 
UPLOADS
1.  Motorola and Copyright Infringement
In the only case addressing sports leagues’ copyright and state law rights over 
game updates, the league was ultimately unsuccessful in proving copyright 
infringement or state law misappropriation.103
100. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc., 2006 WL 3616983 at *8–9.
This case provides guidance for the 
leagues if they hope to make any successful copyright or state law claims; in 
101. “The NFL puts great effort into obtaining advertisers for promotional spots during its 
broadcasts’ commercial breaks” and by circumventing the television market, a user that makes a clip 
directly available to the public on the Internet “has significantly affected the NFL broadcast's immediate 
value.”  Plantinga, supra note 49, at 74.
102. See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. Civ. A. 00-120 & No. Civ. A. 00-
121, 2000 WL 255989, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000).
103. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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particular, the leagues may be able to distinguish social media uploads from the 
activities in this precedential case in order to enforce their social media claims.
In National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., the only case addressing 
potential copyright infringement in real-time sports updates, the NBA sought to 
enjoin Motorola from gathering information about game progress from NBA 
broadcasts and disseminating that information to SportsTrax pager subscribers and 
a corresponding website.104 The data gathered from the broadcasts included team 
names, score, possessions, fouls per quarter and how much time was left in the 
quarter. 105 When Motorola failed to come to terms with the NBA on a license, the 
company decided to have unauthorized statisticians gather game information from 
televised broadcasts of each NBA game and retransmit game data through their 
Motorola pagers themselves.106 At the trial court level, the Unites States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed all of the NBA’s copyright 
claims and ruled that since the underlying sports game and corresponding facts 
were not copyrightable, the pagers were not infringing any NBA copyrights.107
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court dismissal of the copyright claims, 
reiterating that the Copyright Act does not list athletic events as protectable subject 
matter and that, “although the list is concededly non-exclusive, such events are 
neither similar nor analogous to any of the listed categories.”108 The court 
conceded that “case law is scarce on the issue of whether organized events 
themselves are copyrightable” and this lack of case law was “attributable to a 
general understanding that athletic events were, and are, uncopyrightable.”109 The 
Second Circuit agreed with the lower court, asserting that because the pagers 
“reproduced only facts from the broadcasts, not the expression or description of the 
game that constitutes the broadcast,” the pagers did not infringe on any copyrighted 
material.110
104. Id.
  Thus, as will be discussed below, the leagues would need to 
distinguish social media uploads from these pager updates.
105. Id. at 844.
106. Id.
107. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys. (Motorola I), 939 F. Supp. 
1071, 1088, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841.
108. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 846.
109. Id. at 846–47 (emphasis added).  It seems that the court has been more concerned with policy 
considerations like the difficulty of attributing ownership and the need for athletes to build upon each 
other’s plays in concluding that athletic events are not copyrightable.  Query why only this one Second 
Circuit case, which based its copyright denial on “general understanding,” has been deemed a definitive 
authority for the proposition that sports have no copyright protection.  For example, the Baltimore 
Orioles case discussed supra disagreed.  Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 
F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
110. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 847 (“No author may copyright facts or ideas.  The copyright is 
limited to those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s 
originality.” (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991)).
HULL - formatted 4/19/2011 1:59 PM
474 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [34:3
2.  Motorola, Hot News and State Law Claims
Although the copyright claims were all dismissed, the Southern District of New 
York did rule in favor of the NBA’s state commercial misappropriation claims, 
classifying the SportsTrax as “hot news,” a property right distinct enough from 
copyright to survive federal preemption.111 The “hot news” state law 
misappropriation claim derives from International News Service v. Associated 
Press (INS), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that, because the value of news 
depends upon the promptness of its transmission, a news service could be 
restrained from stealing news bulletins that had been issued by a competing news 
service.112 The crux of the hot news misappropriation claim was the injustice of a 
defendant-competitor who misappropriated a product for its own profit, to the 
disadvantage of the plaintiff, the party who bore all of the costs of production.  
Applying this misappropriation claim, the Motorola district court held that 
“through the SportsTrax product . . . defendants disseminated to the NBA fans 
game information on a real-time basis.  In so doing, they have misappropriated the 
essence of NBA’s most valuable property—the excitement of an NBA game in 
progress.”113 The lower court thus ruled that the real-time unauthorized 
retransmittal of a sports game progression gives rise to a state “hot news” 
misappropriation claim that is not preempted under the general scope of the 
Copyright Act.114
Yet, the Second Circuit reversed this state law misappropriation holding on the 
grounds that the transmissions were not “hot news” and thus that the federal 
Copyright Act did preempt the NBA state law claims.115 The federal copyright 
statute preempts any state law claim that addresses rights equivalent to the 
Copyright Act’s statutory rights (i.e., the right to reproduce, to prepare derivative 
works, to distribute, to perform or to display), in works that fall within the statutory 
subject matter (i.e., original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression).116
111. Motorola I, 939 F. Supp. at 1098 (“NBA's claim of misappropriation of its rights in the NBA 
games fails to satisfy the subject matter test of 17 U.S.C. § 301, and, therefore, is not preempted.”).
“All legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright . . . and come within the 
subject matter of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by the ‘Copyrights’ title of 
112. Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239–40, 245–46 (1918).  The Court 
held the defendant liable where it took material that had been acquired by the plaintiff:
as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and which is salable 
by [plaintiff] for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is 
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of it to . . . competitors of [plaintiff] 
is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.
Id.
113. Motorola I, 939 F. Supp. at 1075.
114. Id. at 1098, 1107.
115. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 853–54.
116. Oakes, supra note 64, § 5.
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the United States Code.”117 Conversely, in order to survive federal preemption, a 
state law claim 1) cannot seek to protect one of the rights under the general scope 
of 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 2) cannot be based upon a work protected by the subject 
matter of 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.118
The Second Circuit agreed with the Southern District of New York that the 
“subject matter” of the SportsTrax was within the types of works protected by §§ 
102 and 103—i.e., the copyrightable broadcasts were the source of the Internet 
updates.119 However, unlike the lower court, the Second Circuit held that the 
NBA’s claimed rights were preempted because they were not “hot news” and thus 
fell within the “general scope” of exclusive rights under §106.120 As discussed 
above, the “hot news” doctrine protects the product of a plaintiff’s expenditure of 
labor, skill and money, in order to protect the incentive to create such a product.121
While admitting that the “hot news” element of time sensitivity was present, the 
court found that the NBA did not show “any damage to any of its products based 
on free-riding.”122 The case was therefore “obviously not the situation . . . INS was 
intended to prevent: the potential lack of any such product or service because of 
the anticipation of free-riding.”123
117. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)) (emphasis added).
Foremost in the court’s denial of the “hot news” 
claim was that the NBA’s “primary and secondary products”—the production of 
their game performance and the production of their television broadcasts—would 
118. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 106 (2006).
119. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 848–49 (citing cases where subject matter not within a copyrightable 
category was nonetheless preempted by 17 U.S.C. § 301, as in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674–75 (7th Cir. 1986), where baseball players’ state law right of 
publicity was not infringed when their names and images were used in MLB game telecasts because the 
right of publicity was preempted by § 301 as soon as the games were broadcasted or televised and thus 
became a “subject matter” of 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103).
120. Id. at 847, 854.  According to the Second Circuit in Motorola, a “hot-news” claim can be 
invoked where:  1) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; 2) the information is time 
sensitive; 3) a defendant’s use of the information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff’s efforts; 4) the 
defendant is in direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs and 5) the ability of 
other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce 
the product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened. Id. at 853.  The 
court held that although the real-time factual information provided by the SportsTrax pager is time 
sensitive, the defendants paid the costs of its collection transmission and did not free-ride off NBA.  Id.
at 854.  Further, the Second Circuit ruled that the NBA real-time information did not need “hot news” 
protection because there was no competition with the NBA’s “primary” or “secondary market.”  Id. at 
853.  The primary market was the events themselves, the secondary the broadcasts and telecasts and the 
third market was the dissemination of real-time scores.  Id. The court argued that the NBA would still 
produce games and broadcasts (primary and secondary products), regardless of whether statisticians 
disseminated already publicly available material.  Id. at 854.  Furthermore, the fact that the NBA might 
have plans for a similar pager called Gamestats in the future was not sufficient to qualify for a hot news 
claim.  Id. Notably, however, the court did find that collecting facts from an NBA Gamestats pager to 
retransmit them to SportsTrax pagers would constitute free-riding, might cause Gamestats to be 
unprofitable and would deter the NBA’s transmission of current information to pagers or similar 
devices.  Id. at 854 n.9.
121. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 214 (1918).
122. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 854.
123. Id.
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not be devalued, and the incentive to produce performances and broadcasts would 
not be diminished by the pager threat.124 The NBA did not establish the free-
riding, direct competition and reduced incentive for production sufficient to qualify 
for a “hot news” claim.125
Although the NBA was unable to establish copyright or misappropriation claims 
on its particular facts at the appellate level, Motorola does not represent the end of 
the analysis with respect to sports leagues’ state law claims.  Echoing the lower 
Motorola court’s grant of the NBA’s misappropriation state law claim, which ruled 
that the pagers were exploiting the “essence” of the NBA product by hijacking 
game progression, a few older cases used property law claims to prevent 
unauthorized sports updates.  In one case, a radio station was prohibited from 
placing spectators outside a stadium to relay play-by-play news to a radio station 
for unauthorized broadcast.126 The court ruled: “it is perfectly clear that the 
exclusive right to broadcast play-by-play descriptions of the games played by the 
‘Pirates’ at their home field rests in the plaintiffs.”127 The unauthorized relaying of 
game progression regards a “property right of the plaintiffs with which defendant is 
interfering when it radio broadcasts the play-by-play description of the ball games 
obtained by the observers.”128 The court noted the expense and enormous 
economic resources it takes to put on the performance and that the spectator’s 
unauthorized play-by-play accounts infringed on the sports company’s “legitimate 
right to capitalize on the news value of their games by selling exclusive
broadcasting rights to companies.”129 Similarly, a Florida district court ruled that 
the PGA had the rights under state property law to control the real-time distribution 
of the PGA’s Real-Time Scoring System (“RTSS”).130
[The PGA was] justified in its restrictions because (1) Morris free-rides on the PGA 
Tour’s efforts, (2) the PGA Tour has a property right in the scores before they are in 
the public domain, and (3) the PGA Tour has the right to license or sell broadcasting 
rights of its products over the Internet.
The court found:
131
Notably, these cases rely on state property and misappropriation claims rather 
than copyright claims.  In PGA, the court found that the property right to restrict 
access to the real-time scores was not grounded in copyright law and that the 
124. Id.
125. Id. at 850–54.
126. Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 494 (W.D. Pa. 1938); see also 
Tyler McCormick Love, Note, Throwing The Flag On Copyright Warnings:  How Professional Sports 
Organizations Systematically Overstate Copyright Protection, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 369, 377 (2008).
127. Pittsburgh Athletic Co., 24 F. Supp. at 492.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1282–83 (M.D. Fla. 2002).  
The PGA tracked golfers’ scores through RTSS to an onsite media center and later posted on the Tour 
website.  Id. The PGA invested in a creative information gathering RTSS product and Morris 
Communications tried to publicize the RTSS material for profit before the PGA.  Id.
131. Id.
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“instant case deals with facts that are not subject to copyright protection.”132 The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the PGA’s rights while qualifying “that this case is not 
about copyright law.”133
These cases rely on state law property and misappropriation rights justified by 
economic investment in a sports product; thus, in order to survive preemption, a 
league likely must assert an equivalent proprietary investment in a product in order 
to succeed in such state property law claims.
Arguably, these courts, aware of the Motorola precedent, 
went out of their way to disavow any connection to copyright law in order to avoid 
preemption and to arrive at equitable results.
134
III.  POSSIBLE SPORTS LEAGUE COPYRIGHT CLAIMS
The extension of traditional copyright infringement claims to Internet updates 
implicates unsettled areas of the law, where case law is largely limited to district 
courts.  The 2007 Live Nation decision notes: “litigation over copyright protections 
for live Internet webcasts has not made its way into . . . any other circuit court 
opinions that this court could find.”135 In Motorola, the court regretted that “case 
law is scarce on the issue of whether organized events themselves are copyrightable 
and indicated that there is “a general understanding that athletic events were, and 
are, uncopyrightable.”136
Despite such a paucity of appellate court rulings, the foregoing discussion of the 
case law to date demonstrates certain principles: 1) currently, there can likely be 
no copyright infringement where the uploads originate in unprotected statistics or 
the performance itself rather than a copyrighted broadcast; 2) in order to make a 
copyright infringement claim, “play-by-play” uploads, as distinct from pager 
updates, must be expressive and descriptive enough to be seen as “copying” the 
protected broadcasts and, even assuming that uploads could be distinguishable 
“copies” of broadcasts, the uploads must actually take from the expressive 
copyrightable elements of the broadcast; and lastly, 3) in order to make a “hot 
news” or other state-law claim and avoid federal copyright preemption, the leagues 
must point to the misappropriation of their products, or free-riding by a direct 
competitor, that actually threatens the leagues’ continued production of sports 
performances and broadcasting.
Confronting such a dearth of case law, the Second 
Circuit resorted to a “general understanding” rather than any particular decision at 
the heart of its ruling.
132. Id. at 1281 (emphasis added).
133. Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004).
134. But see Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 494 (ruling for the 
sports league in their state law claims based only on investment in the game performance itself).
135. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, Civ. A. No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 79311, at *3 
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (emphasis added).
136. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
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A. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BASED ON COPYING
Erik Manassy is the author of Jets Twit and a self-proclaimed diehard Jets 
fan.137 Known as “E” and “@e_man” on Twitter, Mr. Manassy was one of the 
earliest adopters of the tool in 2006, as user number 11,000.138 Now with followers 
numbering well over the millions, “@e_man” tweets nearly every thirty seconds, 
tracking and commenting on certain plays and players.139
Great run by Chauncey Washington, lost the ball but it was ruled down [thirteen 
minutes ago]. . . . Clowney on the en-around and 12 yard pickup.  He looked fast 
[twelve minutes ago]. . . . Woodhead with the run for 1 yard [eleven minutes ago]. . . .
Jenkins didn’t sound convincing talking about the depth of the D[efense] [ten minutes 
ago]. . . . Both Chauncey Washington and Danny Woodhead have outperformed 
McKnight, who has 3 fumbles, this preseason . . . Woodhead just made a nice tackle 
on special teams . . Jim Ihedigbo with another CRUSHING HIT!
During just one 
preseason Jets game, in the span of a mere two minutes e_man tweeted:
140
Would the league have any viable copyright infringement claims against e_man?  
As discussed in Part II, supra, the leagues can claim infringement where uploads 
originate from copyrighted material.  The first determinative copyright question 
will be whether uploads are based upon protected elements of the broadcasts, 
infringing on the sports leagues reproduction rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106.141
The second step in the inquiry into infringement of the sports leagues’ 
reproduction right is to determine whether “play-by-play” uploads are expressive 
and descriptive enough to qualify as “copies” of the broadcast.  Even if the users 
are taking the material from copyrighted broadcasts, and if, as in Motorola, the 
uploads consist of limited factual information—team names, scores, possessions, 
fouls per quarter and time—such limited factual uploads would likely constitute 
facts and not “copies” of the broadcast.142 Like the facts transmitted to the pagers, 
most user “tweets” and status updates may include only short sentences, phrases or 
scores from fans—reproductions of facts, not the protected elements of the 
broadcasts.143
137. Erik Manassy, Jets Twit, TWITTER, http://jetstwit.com/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
For example, an upload could consist of only “3_0 jets . . . favre is 
138. Erik Manassy, follow @e_man, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/e_man/lists/jetsplayers (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2011).
139. Erik Manassy, follow @e_man:  New England Patriots vs. New Jersey Jets Game, TWITTER 
(Sept. 19, 2010), http://twitter.com/e_man/lists/jetsplayers.
140. Id.
141. Note that this analysis focuses on copyright infringement based on copying.  Other theories of 
direct copyright infringement that the leagues could make include violations of their public performance 
rights, and public display rights.  Yet, recent case law suggests that clicking links might not implicate 
performance rights.  See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d. 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding that 
because there was no volitional act by Google when users click on a cached link, the act did not 
constitute direct copyright infringement).
142. Motorola I, 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Facts are not protectible because they 
lack originality.”).
143. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 846–47 (2d Cir. 1997) (ruling that sparse facts from broadcasts do 
not reproduce the expressive elements of the broadcasts).
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about to tee off on the jets!”144 This factual upload does not “copy” the protected
expressive material.  As the lower court in Motorola instructed, “copying” requires, 
among other criteria, a “substantial similarity of protectible [sic] material in the two 
works.”145
The issue is unlikely to arise with respect to such updates, as the leagues’ social 
media policies do not even purport to regulate limited and purely factual updates.  
The NFL release specifically focuses on play-by-play accounts that reach the level 
of game approximation, referring only to Internet material that is so strikingly 
similar to copyrighted broadcasts that it could substitute for the broadcast.
Thus, copyright infringement claims regarding social media uploads 
that consist of pure factual updates would likely be dismissed because such uploads 
reproduce only facts and are not “substantially similar” to copyrighted broadcasts.
146 The 
NFL clearly recognizes the limits to which their prohibition extends by explicitly 
noting that their social media policies do not apply to “score updates” or “quarterly 
game updates.”147 The leagues do not attempt to reach those social media uploads 
that are “limited in amount.”148  The league is only concerned with play-by-play 
approximations that are so similar to broadcasts that they could “substitute” for 
accredited league broadcast coverage.149
Attempting to distinguish statistical “score updates” uploads from play-by-play 
uploads that copy accredited broadcasts involves drawing a very fine line.  Internet 
uploads might lie indeterminately between copying factual statistical information 
and copying radio or television broadcasts.  Judicial line drawing will often prove 
necessary in order to distinguish those copies that cross the line from pure factual 
reproduction to infringement of copyrightable elements.150
Here, unlike the pager displays that were found not to copy “the expression or 
description of the game that constitutes the broadcast,” new social media sites have 
much greater audiovisual capabilities that could enable them to “copy” broadcast 
sources.151
144. Lincoln Hawks, Lincoln_Hawks on Twitter, TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2010, 7:10 PM),
http://twitter.com/Lincoln_Hawks.
  The technologically primitive pagers were limited to score, time and 
stats per player, and thus could not approximate “the many decisions that must be 
made during the broadcast of a . . . game concerning camera angles, types of shots, 
the use of instant replays and split screens, and shot selection” that  “similarly 
supply the creativity required for the copyrightability of the telecasts,” which social 
145. Motorola I, 939 F. Supp. at 1093 (citation omitted).
146. Kramer, supra note 3; see also Associated Press, supra note 3 (“The league . . . has always 
barred play-by-play descriptions of games in progress . . . .”).
147. Kramer, supra note 3.
148. Id.
149. Id. (“[G]ame coverage cannot be used as a substitute for, or otherwise approximate, 
authorized play-by-play accounts.” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Associated Press, supra note 
3 (“barr[ing] play-by-play descriptions”).
150. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Here as elsewhere in the 
copyright law there are lines that must be drawn even though reasonable men may differ where [sic].”).
151. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997).
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media sites have the technological capabilities to copy.152
With continuous audiovisual capabilities, Facebook and Twitter can convey at 
least as much expression as a radio broadcast.  Social media sites’ real-time 
uploads could reproduce game progression broadcasts using detailed descriptions, 
audio clips, photos, video clips and a running commentary of the game progression 
and plays.  Although Twitter technically has a 140-word limit per upload, plug-ins 
allow the user to expand and upload continuously beyond one single post.153
“Twit-Pics” also enable more audiovisual capabilities than a pager, which is 
restricted to linguistic rather than visual expression.  Facebook allows a thousand 
words per post and two different “News Feeds”—summary views of the most 
interesting activity that has happened and a real-time view that shows you what is 
happening right now.154  Mark Zuckerberg describes the News Feed “as a 
timeline—or a stream.  As people share more, the timeline gets filled in more and 
more with what is happening with everything you’re connected to.  The pace of 
updates accelerates.  This creates a continuous stream of information.”155 The 
uploading capabilities include descriptive status updates, videos, photos, audio or 
“anything else they want.”156 Thus, real-time mobile uploads to social networking 
sites could cross the line from merely reproducing facts to reproducing the 
expressive broadcast sources.157
Assuming that uploads “copy” an accredited broadcast source, and that these 
uploads are more than mere collections of facts, in order to determine whether the 
copies are infringing, courts will also look at unprotected versus protected elements 
in order to determine whether improper appropriation of the copyrightable material 
has occurred.
If Internet uploaders are transcribing nearly 
exactly what a television or radio broadcaster is communicating, the uploads could 
well be found to constitute a “copy” of the broadcast source material.
158  To qualify as infringing, uploads should copy more than a “de 
minimis” amount of the source broadcast, which may be determined in relation to a 
quantitative or qualitative standard.159
152. Motorola I, 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986)).
A court might find either quantitative or 
153. Expand Twitter’s 140 Word Limit and Tell the Complete Story, WINANDMAC.COM (Mar. 23, 
2008, 5:32 PM), http://www.winandmac.com/tips/expand-twitter-140-word-limit-and-tell-the-complete-
story/.
154. Raylene Yung, New Views for Your Home Page, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Oct. 23, 2009, 1:00 
PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=162536657130.
155. Mark Zuckerberg, Improving Your Ability to Share and Connect, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Mar. 
4, 2009, 3:17 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=57822962130.
156. Id.
157. See Clifford N. MacDonald, Gamecasts and NBA v. Motorola: Do They Still Love this 
Game?, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 329, 339–40 (2004).
158. See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(copying the bird’s eye view genre of an illustration would not be improper appropriation, but copying 
details like the block letters, lighting, windows and block print would be copyright infringement).
159. See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The 
qualitative component concerns the copying of expression, rather than ideas, a distinction that often 
turns on the level of abstraction at which the works are compared.  The quantitative component 
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qualitative “de minimis” taking of the copyrighted material if the uploads are 
describing the same replays, commentary, description of players, shot selection, 
video or audio clips, or are otherwise reproducing the creative decision making 
behind the broadcast.  In order to infringe, the uploads must reproduce creative 
elements of what the cameramen and the director are doing, which constitutes 
“authorship” in the sports broadcast source material.  The leagues have a strong 
infringement case where there is reproduction of specific details, sequences and 
structure that are not included in the uncopyrightable facts.160
Yet, even if, as the preceding discussion has suggested, the leagues can make a 
claim that some uploads impermissibly copy broadcast source material, the 
difficulties of enforcement against individual uploaders seem difficult to 
overcome.161 After proving infringement by the user in the first place, the leagues 
would likely be better served by proving secondary liability of hosting sites and 
invoking the notice and takedown features of the DMCA, although the leagues 
themselves will bear the burden of identifying which continual users or accounts 
post play-by-play descriptions that approximate the game broadcasts.162
B. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT AND THE DMCA
“SAFE HARBOR”
Given the difficulty of bringing actions against individual uploaders, the leagues 
might instead look to hosting sites like Facebook and Twitter, invoking copyright 
law’s application of the doctrine of secondary liability, which may be further 
divided into vicarious liability or contributory liability.  Vicarious liability grew out 
of the theory of respondeat superior in tort law, and arises where the secondary 
party has 1) the right and ability to control and 2) a financial stake in the infringing 
activity.163 Contributory liability requires 1) knowledge of the infringing acts and 
2) any inducement or contribution to infringement, such as aiding or abetting.164
generally concerns the amount of the copyrighted work that is copied, a consideration that is especially 
pertinent to exact copying.”) (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 13.03 [A][2] (1997)).
160. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 397 (1940).
161. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
162. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
163. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262–63 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 
vicarious liability where the defendant operated a swap meet where vendors sold illegal copyright 
infringing copies of plaintiff’s music because the defendant had 1) the ability to control who sells at the 
swap meet and 2) the defendant made money from the vendors); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding vicarious liability where defendant Napster’s 
program was being used by end users to illegally copy plaintiff’s music because “turning a blind eye to 
detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability” and the only means to escape 
vicarious liability is to police infringement).
164. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (finding contributory infringement because the defendant swap 
meet owners were told about the activity and they actively tried to provide an environment for 
counterfeit activity to thrive); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 
913, 919 (2005) (finding that, where Grokster hosted a website that was capable of both lawful and 
unlawful uses, it was liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the product because 
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However, any such claims of copyright infringement based on secondary 
liability would be countered by the invocation of the safe harbor provision in Title 
II of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).165 The provision exempts online service 
providers, defined in part by 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) as “a provider of online services or 
network access,” from what would otherwise qualify as secondary liability.166 The 
DMCA specifically protects such Internet sites that passively host content, comply 
with certain statutory rules and cooperate when receiving qualifying takedown 
notices from copyright owners.167 Given that Facebook and Twitter provide 
“online services” and host user-submitted description uploads, these sites would 
arguably be covered under § 512(c).168
[S]hall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection (j), for 
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
The DMCA provides that hosting websites:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances
from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, 
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.169
In simple language, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) requires “clean hands and empty heads”; 
a host will be protected by the DMCA if it does not have actual or apparent 
knowledge of infringing activity, or, if it does have knowledge, the site responds 
expeditiously to remove the material claimed to be infringing.  To abide by the 
it demonstrated clear expression and other affirmative steps that fostered infringement; mere knowledge 
of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough to subject a distributor to 
liability); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (holding that if a defendant learns of specific infringing material 
available on its Internet system and fails to purge it, the defendant knows of and contributes to direct 
infringement).
165. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.  The DMCA gives Internet service providers 
and “hosting” services a safe harbor from secondary liability for copyright infringement where such 
sites, like Facebook and Twitter, are hosting content at the direction of infringing third-party users.  17 
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1–3).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 512(k).
167. See id. § 512(c)(1)–(3).
168. Id. § 512(c).
169. Id. § 512(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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notice and takedown requirements, the hosting site must have a “designated agent” 
that receives the notifications and ensures that accounts are compliant.170 The 
leagues would also need to comply with the DMCA’s required elements of 
notification.171  Upon notification of claimed infringement by the sports leagues, 
the social media sites would need to respond “expeditiously to remove, or disable 
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity.”172
Under this scheme, the sports leagues would have the burden of identifying 
those accounts that cross the line from factual squibs, score updates and quarterly 
summaries to expressively approximated game broadcasts.  However, given that § 
512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires only a “statement that the complaining party has a good 
faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized 
by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law,” the leagues might be able to 
implement the notice and takedown provisions without undue burden or risk.173
Section 512(f) sets a high standard for finding copyright owners (here, the sports 
leagues), liable for damages to the hosting sites (Facebook and Twitter); such 
liability would attach only if the leagues were to “knowingly, materially 
misrepresent[]” that certain social media uploads are infringing.174 Thus, it is cost-
efficient for the leagues to send notice and takedown requests as a general strategy 
because the hosting sites can’t protest unless there is “knowing” misrepresentation 
of copyright infringement.175 In Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America Inc., the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the DMCA requires subjective good faith; if a website or 
account creates the impression that infringing material might be available, and there 
is no evidence that the copyright holder knew otherwise, the court will find good 
faith.176 The Supreme Court held that a “good faith belief” does not require a 
copyright holder to conduct a reasonable investigation to establish actual 
infringement prior to sending notice.177
170. Id. § 512(c)(2).
Thus, the leagues only need have a 
subjective good faith belief that certain website accounts are infringing their 
copyrighted broadcasts in order to satisfy the DMCA’s good faith requirement and 
171. Id. § 512(c)(3) (requiring 1) the signature of the person authorized to act for the copyright 
holder; 2) identification of the copyrighted work infringed, or if multiple works, a representative list of 
the works on that site; 3) identification of the infringing material and information sufficient to permit 
service provider to locate the material; 4) contact information of the copyright holder; 5) a statement that 
the copyright holder acted in good faith; and 6) a statement that the information is accurate).
172. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
173. Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
174. Id. § 512(f) (emphasis added).
175. See Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (suggesting 
that knowing misrepresentation means the party “actually knew, should have known if it acted with 
reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, 
that it was making misrepresentations”).
176. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 1018 (2005).
177. Id. at 1004. (“Congress could have, but did not, expressly import a specific objective standard 
or reasonable investigation requirement into § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).”).
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successfully invoke the notice and takedown provisions.
C. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BASED ON UNAUTHORIZED DERIVATIVE WORKS
In addition to copyright infringement based on copying (whether on theories of 
direct or secondary liability), the leagues could argue that news feeds and social 
media accounts are unauthorized derivative works of copyrighted broadcasts.178
The owner of copyright has the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work.”179 To be categorized as a derivative work that 
infringes on the exclusive right to adapt, a work needs to exhibit sufficient 
creativity to be a “new copyrightable work” on its own, while remaining 
substantially similar to the original work.180 The derivative work must recast, 
adapt and transform the original.181 As discussed, social media uploads are capable 
of reproducing the copyrightable expressions of the broadcasts and may generate 
enough creativity and authorship to constitute “new copyrightable works” and be a 
derivative work.  The NFL’s own social media uploads could be deemed 
sufficiently different from the traditional radio and television media to “recast” the 
accredited broadcasts.182
In order to determine whether the “right to adapt” has been infringed, courts 
often look to whether the derivative work could substitute for the original author’s 
work in the economic market.183
178. See MacDonald, supra note 157, at 340.
As has been noted throughout this analysis, the 
accredited broadcasts face very real threats of economic substitution, and the 
leagues’ own social media accounts directly compete with third-party uploads of 
sporting events.  Acknowledging the role of economic substitution, the PGA court 
recognized digital RTSS as a type of derivative product, ruling that the Internet 
provided an opportunity to profit on a nearly identical principle as that applicable to 
television, radio and print media: “the PGA Tour has a right to sell or license its 
product, championship golf, and its derivative product, golf scores, on the Internet 
179. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
180. Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the derivative 
work must also substantially incorporate material from the preexisting work that is protected by 
copyright); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that a derivative 
based upon reproduction of work of art must “contain some substantial, not merely trivial, originality . . . 
.” (internal citations omitted)).  Thus, a derivative work must both have its own independent creativity 
and take substantially from the preexisting work.
181. Oakes, supra note 64, § 14 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).  “Various matters have been held 
copyrightable as derivative works, such as a dubbed or subtitled foreign film, a particular production of 
a play, a three-dimensional figure derived from a drawing, and a reworking of a translation.” Id.
(citations omitted).  It seems that an Internet stream of creative material could be a derivative work.
182. See Muñoz v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 829 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Alaska 1993) (granting a 
preliminary injunction because mounting copyrighted notecards on ceramic tiles sufficiently “recast” the 
cards and was an infringing derivative work), aff’d, 38 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1994).
183. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc., 536 F.2d 486 (denying copyright protection for the derivative 
plastic version of the bank because it was just trying to cheaply replace the market for the iron version).
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in the same way the PGA Tour currently sells its rights to television broadcasting
stations.”184
Although the PGA case did not address copyright issues, the equitable argument 
that the sports company should have the right to make its own derivative products 
revolves around the same economic policy rationale that is presented in copyright
derivative infringement claims.  Although this derivative works argument is not 
explicitly found within the leagues’ current social media policies, infringement of 
the NFL’s right to adapt its broadcast sources on the Internet seems a plausible 
claim against uploaders that make use of sports broadcasts.185
IV.  STATE LAW CLAIMS
As an alternative remedy to protect against the unlawful use of their broadcast 
material, the leagues could turn to state law misappropriation claims, on the model 
of the “hot news” right established in INS.186 As discussed in Section II.D supra,
to be successful in these claims the leagues will need to distinguish social media 
uploads from the pager uploads in Motorola.187
In INS, the “hot news” right was a right against defendant’s unauthorized 
interference with the operation of the plaintiff’s business precisely at the time 
sensitive point where the profit was going to be reaped; the defendant was diverting 
a material portion of the profit away from those who had earned it, to the benefit of 
those who had not.188 The defendant, who stole from the plaintiff’s news bulletins, 
gained a special advantage in not being burdened with any of the expense of 
gathering the news.189 Similarly here, the value of a broadcast of a game in 
progress “depends upon the promptness of transmission,” as in INS, and 
contemporaneous Internet accounts of the game could detract from the value of 
copyrighted broadcasts that the leagues have invested heavily in producing.190
184. Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2002).  
As will be discussed in the next section, the Morris case is relevant for the sports leagues’ state law 
property claims.
In 
Motorola, the court held that such INS “hot news” misappropriation claims 
surviving preemption under the Copyright Act are limited to cases where: 1) the 
plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; 2) that information is time 
sensitive; 3) the defendant’s use of information constitutes free riding on plaintiff’s 
185. In addition to the argument that the NFL could gain control over social media as derivative 
works, perhaps official league uploads could be deemed copyrightable “factual compilations.”  See Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (stating that there could be 
copyright protection if “choices as to selection and arrangement . . . entail a minimal degree of 
creativity”).  As repeatedly discussed, statistical lists do not involve the requisite creativity and 
originality, but the leagues’ own social media uploads could be copyrightable where no users could use 
or reproduce the leagues’ own Internet game approximations.
186. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 214 (1918).
187. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997).
188. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 240.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 230.
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efforts; 4) the defendant is in direct competition with product or service offered by 
plaintiff; and 5) the ability of other parties to free ride on efforts of plaintiff and 
others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its 
existence or quality would be substantially threatened.191
Here, elements one and two are obviously met since the league plaintiffs gather 
the information at a cost—regular-season football telecasts are major productions 
that can cost between $150,000 and $250,000—and the sports information is 
extremely sensitive to timing, given that few fans are interested in viewing re-
enactments of already known scores.192
In order to assert that the infringing social media uploads fit within the “hot 
news” context, however, the leagues would need to prove more: specifically, the 
additional elements that were not present in Motorola—free riding by the defendant 
uploaders, direct competition and a threat to the very existence of the product or 
service provided by the plaintiff.193
In terms of elements four and five—direct competition and a reduced incentive
to produce their product—unlike Motorola, here the leagues have already 
established their own Facebook and Twitter products, which would be in direct
competition with unauthorized social media Internet uploads.  For instance, the 
Washington Redskins have a user profile on Facebook that provides the roster, 
depth chart, coaching, staff, schedule, team news, Gameday previews, Redskins 
TV, Redskins Radio, tickets, merchandising links and stadium info.194 In addition, 
Redskins followers can follow commentary and updates, photos, videos and 
links.195 The account also provides direct links to players’ Twitter accounts.196 In 
addition, the Redskins account links to the Twitter accounts of ESPNRadio, 
ExtremeSkins, RedskinsGameday (which gives score updates during the game) and 
the Editorial Director of the Redskins Media Department.197
191. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 845.  The Second Circuit held:
Even the Miami 
Dolphins, the least “Twitter friendly” team, which does not even let public 
spectators bring in their PDAs to practices, has an official Facebook page, 
The . . . ‘hot-news’ INS-like claim is limited to cases where:  (i) a plaintiff generates or gathers 
information at a cost; (ii) the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use of the 
information constitutes free riding on the plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct 
competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties 
to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the 
product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.
Id.
192. Id. at 853 (“The information transmitted to SportsTrax is not precisely contemporaneous, but 
it is nevertheless time-sensitive.”).  For the costs of major sports production, see Biderman, supra note 
56.
193. Motorola II, 105 F.3d at 853–54 (“[T]he NBA has failed to show any competitive effect 
whatsoever from SportsTrax on the first and second products and a lack of any free-riding . . . .”).
194. Washington Redskins Official Facebook Page, FACEBOOK,
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designated by the “official” stamp of approval.198 Already, there are signs that the 
club and league accounts are competing with third-party accounts; the websites try 
to distinguish these “official” accounts from copycat accounts in their profiles.199
The official Facebook accounts link to various commercial purchases like ticket 
sales, promotional contests, events, newsletters and merchandising.200 Facebook 
recently announced that users can purchase credits with PayPal, and can use those 
credits to purchase virtual goods with all applications that accept them.201
Even if user accounts are in direct competition with the leagues’ own social 
media products, a counterargument against “hot news” claims may be brought 
asserting that the competitive element of the hot news analysis can only be satisfied 
by direct competition with copyright holders’ primary or secondary products
(game performance or broadcast production).
The 
league accounts have thus created a source of income and an economic market on 
the Internet in direct competition with unauthorized accounts.  Third-party social 
media accounts that directly compete with the leagues’ own social media accounts 
and broadcasts could reduce the incentive for the leagues to continue to market 
some of their own Internet products.  The public may lose access to the clubs’ 
production of information on Facebook and Twitter because the leagues may 
decide not to invest in these products.  Thus, in regards to the elements of direct 
competition and reduced incentive to produce, the leagues here arguably have 
stronger claims than those of the plaintiffs in Motorola.
202 Given that continuous uploads 
tracking the sports performance may not provide the same level of audiovisual 
entertainment as traditional media, such Internet technology may not be a substitute 
for television or radio broadcasts; consumers will always prefer televised games to 
lower technology Internet play-by-play accounts.  However, as noted above, one 
could argue that the increasingly sophisticated, multimedia Internet play-by-play 
descriptions indeed threaten television and (even more seriously) radio
broadcasts.203 Younger generations are increasingly comfortable with digital forms 
of entertainment in lieu of traditional broadcast mediums.204
198. In regards to the stringent Dolphins’ policy, see Associated Press, supra note 14.  For the 
official Miami Dolphins page, see Miami Dolphins:  Company, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
Again, two-thirds of 
sports leagues’ revenue hinges on exclusivity; Internet users that circumvent the 
broadcast market and make game play-by-plays directly available to the public on 
MiamiDolphins?ref=ts (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
199. See Miami Dolphins:  Company, supra note 198 (noting the small facebook designation in the 
bottom corner of the profile picture).
200. Washington Redskins Official Facebook Page, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
redskins?ref=ts (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
201. Deborah Liu, Expanding Our Commitment to Facebook Credits, FACEBOOK (Feb. 25, 2010, 
2:30 PM), http://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/364.
202. See Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 853–54 (2d Cir. 1997).
203. See Lunardi, supra note 39, at 1083–84.
204. Jane Weaver, Teens Tune out TV, Log on Instead, TECH AND GADGETS: MSNBC.COM (2010),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078614/ns/technology_and_science-tech_and_gadgets/ (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2011).
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the Internet could “significantly affect[] the NFL broadcast’s immediate value.”205
Decreases in broadcast revenue may threaten the production of performances that 
can cost between $150,000 and $250,000.206  The leagues could likely show the 
requisite competitive effect where their licensing revenues of copyrighted 
television or radio broadcasts suffered.207 Evidence already indicates that the 
Internet displaces the market for radio and television.208
The most difficult “hot news” element to prove will be whether social media 
users free ride on any information-gathering product invested in or created by the 
leagues, or whether the users do all their own collection and assimilation for their 
uploads.  Here, the case appears a closer one than in Motorola: while the 
statisticians in Motorola were clearly doing their own information-gathering, here 
the leagues expend resources to create Internet accounts with unique features that 
the leagues could argue are being appropriated by third-party social media 
accounts.  If the third-party accounts could be shown to be free riding off of the 
official league accounts, the free riding element would be met here.  As the court in 
Motorola admitted, if the SportsTrax pagers “were to collect facts from an 
enhanced Gamestats pager to retransmit them to SportsTrax pagers, that would 
constitute free-riding.”
Therefore, the leagues 
may well be able to navigate around the holding of Motorola in proving the 
elements of direct competition and reduced incentive to produce.
209
Regardless of the leagues’ ultimate ability to argue this hot news claim, this 
Note has attempted to distinguish the potential league plaintiffs in the current social 
media context as presenting more convincing arguments on at least two of the three 
elements that the NBA lacked in Motorola. In addition, the leagues could look to 
other decisions supporting sports companies’ “legitimate right to capitalize on the 
news value of their games by selling exclusive broadcasting rights to 
companies.”
However, it will be difficult to prove such free riding off 
of official Internet accounts; moreover, as discussed repeatedly, users formulate 
their game-approximating uploads by gathering sports information on their own.  
Thus, although the leagues seem to have much better free riding arguments than in 
Motorola, it is unclear how the courts will rule.
210
205. See Plantinga, supra note 49, at 51.
These decisions repeatedly seem to rely on equitable arguments in 
206. Biderman, supra note 56.
207. MacDonald, supra note 157, at 342.
208. Lunardi, supra note 39, at 1083–84.
209. Motorola II, 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997).
210. See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. Pa.1938).  At the 
administrative level as well, equitable considerations in favor of greater protection have trumped 
concerns of overbreadth. A late 2007 ruling by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) suggests that 
these risks of potential overbreadth in the application of copyright law should not limit the leagues’ 
ability to issue copyright warnings.  The FTC refused to grant the Computer & Communications 
Industry Association (“CCIA”) an injunction against sports leagues’ alleged “manifestly false” 
copyright warnings. See Walker & Savare, supra note 7, at 28.  The CCIA argued that the copyright 
warning is “‘manifestly false’ because the Copyright Act does not protect facts or ideas” and “makes no 
allowance for . . . the principle that facts are not copyrightable.”  Id. at 29–30.  However, the FTC staff 
declined to take any action, citing first the lack of a “sufficient basis to conclude that consumers would 
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recognizing a “property right of the plaintiffs with which defendant is interfering 
when it broadcasts the play-by-play description of the ball games obtained by the 
observers.”211
V.  CONCLUSION
The onslaught of new Internet social media and peer sharing technologies 
threatens sports leagues’ licensed broadcast rights.  In response, the leagues have 
issued new social media policies to protect their investments in their creative 
products.  To enforce their rights in these investments and products, this Note has 
argued that the leagues can either point to the copyright law regime or to state law 
misappropriation claims.  If, as academics contend, sports performances are not 
copyrightable, under copyright law the leagues may argue that user uploads take 
from copyrighted broadcasts, that play-by-play uploads are expressive enough to 
“copy” broadcasts and that the uploads take from the copyrightable elements of the 
broadcast.  Upon finding such primary infringing activity, in lieu of problematic 
actions against individual users, the leagues could attempt to hold the social media 
website hosts liable on theories of secondary liability.  Although the websites 
would seek to avoid such liability under the DMCA, any such invocation would 
trigger notice and takedown provisions that would force the sites to take down 
identified infringing user accounts. Moreover, the leagues’ remedies would not be 
limited to those associated with violations of the right to make “copies” of 
copyrightable works; the right to create derivative works may also be implicated in 
social media uploading of play-by-play accounts. Finally, as an alternative to 
copyright infringement, the leagues may bring state law claims that could arguably 
survive federal copyright preemption by navigating the requirements of Motorola
and invoking additional, state law equitable precedent.  Sports leagues new social 
media policies are a narrowly tailored response to the real economic threat that this 
Internet age poses to traditional broadcasts.  Sports leagues should be able to 
enforce these policies, whether through copyright or state law, against the 
view those brief warnings as complete statements of their rights with respect to the works,” and second, 
lack of a “sufficient basis to conclude that consumers would be likely to refrain from engaging in lawful 
activities as a consequence of reading those warnings.”  Id. at 30; see also id. at 32, n.32 (citing Letter 
from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Edward J. Black & Matthew Schruers, 
CCIA (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/071206ccia.pdf).  Most 
importantly, for purposes of this social media upload analysis, the FTC staff claimed that the “safest 
course is always to get permission from the copyright owner before using copyrighted material.” Id.
The FTC favored the leagues’ warnings because they incentivized permission, highlighted penalties and 
encouraged a cautious approach.
211. Pittsburgh Athletic, 24 F. Supp. at 492; see also Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (recognizing a property right in the sports company’s 
RTSS product based on an equitable valid business reason for restricting access up until the time that the 
scores are published; this suggests that leagues have property or contract rights to control “insider” 
uploads from spectators inside their stadiums because the only recipients of the disputed information at 
that moment are those whom the leagues have placed conditions on for their access to the performance);
Roberts, supra note 48, at 187.
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unauthorized Internet entertainment use of the leagues’ copyrighted material and 
performance property.
